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Introduction
Our three-panel picture (Figure 1) demonstrates how 
contemporary observers derived a precise description 
of historical events from Napoleon’s invasion of Russia 
(Figure 1A), how they translated these descriptions into 
military concepts (Figure 1B), and how, over centuries, 
these concepts have matured into general models of 
military intervention (Figure 1C). Today, such models serve 
as inspiration for high-ranking military leaders. Military 
and medical intervention takes place in substantially 
different settings and they have profoundly different 
objectives. Nonetheless, in this essay we show how concepts 
and models from military history can inspire medical 
intervention (Figure 1D). 
Military history
On Midsummer Day 1812, Napoleon crossed the Neman 
River to invade Russia (Figure 1A). At that time, he was 
in command of the biggest army ever raised in European 
history. However, already a fortnight before Christmas, 
Napoleon’s campaign reached a disastrous end. Of 422,000 
soldiers, only 10,000 survived to re-cross the Neman 
River. Napoleon had lost his army, his glory and he was 
about to lose his empire. At the beginning of his campaign, 
Napoleon predicted sure victory, as he was only a few 
kilometers behind the Polish border. The Tsar’s army 
retreated and left the French unsupplied on scorched 
Russian earth. Whereas the Tsar tried to avoid a decisive 
battle, Napoleon did everything to force it. Therefore, 
Napoleon chased the Russian army in a frantic race through 
the summer heat while his soldiers died from thirst, 
exhaustion, and missing supplies. On August 17, Napoleon 
entered Smolensk. At that time, two thirds of his army were 
already dead, and the remaining forces were only equal in 
size to the Russian army. With his depots 500 kilometers 
away, Napoleon’s army was running out of supplies whereas 
the Russian army received support from their peasants. 
Napoleon ignored the shift of forces and pushed his army 
over another 400 kilometers into Moscow. On this march, 
Napoleon lost another 45,000 soldiers. In deserted Moscow, 
Napoleon waited for the Tsar to beg for peace. However, 
after one month of waiting in vain, the advancing winter 
forced Napoleon to withdraw. Napoleons army retreated 
over scorched roads in icy winter. During this retreat, 
another 90,000 soldiers died from Cossack raids, disease, 
hunger, and freezing (4).
Moving from history to description, and further 
to concepts 
The Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) was 
an eyewitness to Napoleon’s Russian invasion. Clausewitz 
served as an advisor to the Russian army, where he gave a 
detailed description of the military events (3). Based on his 
account, the French engineer Charles Joseph Minard (1781–
1870) drew a map to summarize the disastrous French losses 
during this campaign. With this famous map, Minard, for 
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Figure 1 The evolution from history, to concepts, to models. (A) “The boasted crossing of the Neman, at the opening of the campaign in 
1812, by Napoleon Bonaparte” based on a drawing by an officer, painted by John Heaviside Clark and engraved by Matthew Dubourg (1). (B) 
Modification of Charles Minard’s 1869 chart showing the number of men in Napoleon’s army in 1812 during attack (red) and retreat (grey), 
their movements, and the temperatures during retreat (2). The “x” in the circle at Smolensk marks the culmination point of the French 
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the first time in the history of statistics, depicted the scale 
of disaster. On the same map, he visualized how Napoleon 
sacrificed thousands of human lives during retreat in a 
hopeless race against declining temperatures of the Russian 
winter (Figure 1B) (5). 
Clausewitz moved from the description of the Russian 
campaign to the discovery of a key concept, which he named 
the “culminating point of attack”. Clausewitz reasoned 
that Napoleon’s attack on Russia required a force that was 
superior to the force of the Russian defense. Napoleon’s 
attack weakened through casualties, increasing distances 
to supply bases, and the need to defend their conquered 
ground. Clausewitz concluded that attack culminated 
where its force was equal to the force of defense. At this 
culminating point of attack, Clausewitz reasoned that attack 
had to revert to defense. If instead, the attack “overshoots 
culmination”, the force of defense will gain the upper hand, 
with defeat of the attacker as a necessary consequence (6). 
According to Clausewitz’ analysis, Napoleon reached 
culmination in Smolensk (Figure 1B). Here, Napoleon 
should have stopped the attack to avoid his own predictable 
defeat (3). Clausewitz mentioned two major reasons why 
military leaders overshoot the culminating point. First, 
the attacker’s psychology makes it less difficult to go on 
than to stop (7), where lack of self-criticism, stubbornness, 
and over-ambition may be additional contributing factors. 
Second, the attacker’s mind may ignore culmination because 
of missing or distorted information, a phenomenon that 
Clausewitz captured in his concept of friction. Today this 
concept is better known as the “fog of war” (8). 
Moving from concepts to models
Military attack
Milan Vego, as author of a today’s standard textbook 
on operational warfare, used Clausewitz’ concept of 
culmination to derive a prototypic curve of military attack. 
In this curve he depicted the gradual decline of actual combat 
power during attack (9). To describe the attacker’s actual 
combat power, the U.S. army defines operational reach 
(OR) as the distance and duration across which the attacker 
is able to employ his combat power. To model Vego’s curve 
as mathematical function, we define operational reach 
as the difference of the attacker’s combat power P minus 
his combat efforts E (comprising offensive and defensive 
actions), resulting in a basic equation of military attack: 
OR = P(t) − E(t), where “t” stands for time. Clausewitz’ 
culminating point is where the attackers’ and the defenders’ 
operational reach are at equilibrium. When the attacker 
continues to advance after culmination, defeat is the attack’s 
most likely result. For victory, the attacker needs to reach 
an inflection point where the direction of the function curve 
turns from decline to increase of operational reach. Usually 
inflection takes place when the attacker attains military 
advantages. The attacker can increase his combat power, 
e.g., by exploiting resources of conquered ground, drafting 
more troops, by reverting from attack to defense, or because 
of a substantial decline of the defender’s resistance. For a 
certain victory, attack should reach inflection well ahead of 
culmination (Figure 1C). 
Medical intervention
Similar to a military attack, surgery or percutaneous 
intervention initially leads to a deterioration of the patient’s 
condition. Let us consider the actual health status as coping 
capacity of a patient CCP, and let us suppose that this equals 
the difference between resilience R and disease D, which 
is CCP  = R(t)−D(t), where “t” stands for time. Similar 
to a military attack, the initial phase of an intervention 
reduces the coping capacity by reducing resilience without 
reducing disease burden. Consider, for example, coronary 
artery bypass surgery, where narcotics, sternotomy, 
preparation of bypass vessels, and extracorporeal circulation 
reduce physical resilience. At some point, the decline 
in resilience can reach a threshold beyond which the 
patient’s resilience collapses, with death as a likely result. 
This point corresponds to the culmination of a military 
attack. A successful intervention needs inflection of 
the curve from decrease to increase of coping capacity. 
Usually inflection takes place through treatment of the 
disease. In bypass surgery, the aim of therapy is to reduce 
coronary artery disease. Heart surgeons reduce adverse 
myocardial effects by using a coronary bypass. However, 
to maximize coping capacity, intervention has two options: 
to reduce disease, or to increase resilience. Therefore, 
after inflection, it becomes possible to increase resilience 
by weaning the patient from heart-lung bypass, ending 
mechanical ventilation, and by closing the sternum. Early 
mobilization, breathing exercises, and rehabilitation will 
bring the full exploit of the intervention with additional 
gains of coping capacity. Similar to a military intervention, 
medical intervention should reach inflection far before 
culmination (Figure 1D).
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Discussion
At the level of concrete events, military history and medical 
intervention lack similarity. At the level of concepts and 
models, both disciplines can share insights nonetheless. 
Mutual learning of military and medicine goes back to 
ancient history. As a prime example, the Greek general 
and historian Thucydides applied the medical concept of 
prognosis based on causal understanding of human nature 
in his famous analysis of the Peloponnesian war, to predict 
the course of historical events. He derived his concept from 
Hippocrates, who at Thucydides times was a celebrated 
founder of a new, “science-based” medicine (10). 
The first question is whether there is empirical evidence 
for our assumption of non-linear dynamics. Minard’s 
graphical mapping of the numbers of French troops 
according to time and space suggests non-linear decline 
of combat power during attack. Since then, such a non-
linear decline of combat power was corroborated in many 
military campaigns (11). In medicine, there is evidence for 
non-linear behavior of disease, treatment, and resilience. 
First, untreated disease exhibits non-linear growth, as is 
well-documented for growth of bacterial populations (12), 
pancemic spread such as COVID-19 (13), and growth 
of tumor mass (14). Second, non-linearity of a disease 
response to therapy is shown for bacterial inactivation 
through antibiotics (15), and for tumor shrinkage through 
radiation and chemotherapy (16). Finally, researchers 
define physical resilience as the ability to resist or recover 
from functional decline following a health stressor, such as 
infection, surgery, fracture, bed rest, or chemotherapy (17). 
Only just recently the emergence of novel analytical tools 
for estimating resilience appears to suggest non-linear 
response of physical resilience to disease and medical 
intervention (18).
Another question is whether the crossing of concepts 
between disciplines is just an intellectual game or whether 
it has a distinct value. With respect to military practice, 
history provided abundant proof of the value of the 
concept of culmination. It is unquestioned, that military 
leaders who avoided culmination prevented losses, whereas 
leaders who overreached culmination caused thousands 
of unnecessary deaths (11). How about medicine? The 
numbers of preventable deaths may be similar to those 
of today’s military conflicts or “roughly equivalent to the 
number of lives lost if a fully loaded jumbo jet crashed 
each day” (19). The exact numbers, the spectrum and the 
causes of medical errors and preventable deaths in medicine 
remain to be specified (20). However, it is undisputed, that 
many unnecessary deaths relate to intervention, where 
interventional overreach as well as underreach may play 
important roles (21). In line with our findings, the “choosing 
wisely” campaign of the American Board of Internal 
Medicine made obvious the dilemma between killing a 
patient because of doing too much, versus killing a patient 
because of doing too little (22). 
Concepts of culmination can be useful in medical 
education to clarify the key rules of intervention. For 
example, to maximize coping capacity, intervention must 
hasten inflection and delay culmination. In coronary 
surgery, measures to hasten inflection may be to increase 
resilience by myocardial reperfusion, to minimize the goal 
of intervention by vascularizing only important coronaries, 
or to split the goal by using percutaneous techniques 
postoperatively for less important coronary arteries. Once 
it becomes clear that inflection is impossible, termination 
of the intervention is usually the consequence. When 
intervention approaches culmination, it is imperative to 
take measures to increase resilience. A decision to perform 
major surgery or extensive percutaneous intervention is 
justified only with the clear prospect of high gains in coping 
capacity. Besides such key rules, our model clarifies, even to 
novices, the hazards of interventional psychology: Napoleon 
was a military genius but he overreached because he found 
it more difficult to stop the attack than to go on.
As with Clausewitz’ “fog of war”, it is one issue to know 
about the point of inflection or culmination, but it is another 
to identify such points (23). Today, during intervention, 
there may be monitoring of body temperature, heart rate, 
ECG, blood pressure, gas saturation, radiation dose, and 
use of contrast agents. However, these variables inform 
only insufficiently about the patients’ actual resilience and 
disease status. Therefore, the advance of culmination may 
not become apparent early and clearly enough. Future 
interdisciplinary studies using mathematical modeling with 
the identification of key variables of resilience and disease 
may support timely prediction of turning points during 
medical intervention.
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